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RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY IN 
ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE: 
HOW THE SUPREME COURT FLAUNTS 
AND FLUNKS CONTRACTS 
 
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In contract law, what parties intend is more important than what judges 
think, no less true concerning arbitration clauses. Yet many nineteenth-century 
judges disfavored arbitration and often refused to enforce clauses agreeing to 
such means of dispute resolution. Congress reversed that hostility in a 1925 
statute, now called the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).1 Through the FAA, 
Congress directed judges to enforce arbitration agreements as they enforce 
other contracts, allowing that they could be unenforceable on such grounds as 
any other contract. That reversal succeeded, boosted by dozens of Supreme 
Court opinions since 1983 expanding the federal statute’s sweep.2 After 
arbitration won legitimacy nationwide, some judges became hostile to 
litigation,3 and many are enamored of arbitration.4 The truth remains, however, 
that what judges believe should matter less than what people intend, for 
arbitration has long been recognized as a contractual route to private dispute 
resolution.5 
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 1.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006). New York adopted a state arbitration act in 1920, on which the FAA 
is based. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 30 (2d ed. 2006).  
 2.  See generally Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983–1995: A 
Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996).  
 3.  See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1139–46 (2006). 
 4.  See, e.g., Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 5.  As Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote during the period just after the FAA was passed:  
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Reflecting this contractual basis of arbitration, the FAA declares that any 
“written provision” agreeing to resolve designated disputes by arbitration in 
any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” is “enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”6 The statute targeted commercial actors, which often reneged on 
signed arbitration agreements,7 and also aimed to uphold similar commitments 
made in non-commercial arbitration agreements.8 Despite that clarity and 
context, the Supreme Court in recent decades heralds the FAA as stating a 
sweeping national policy favoring arbitration that preempts contrary state law.9  
True, in some older cases, the Court rightly stressed that the FAA’s primary 
purpose was reversing judicial hostility to arbitration and enforcing contractual 
commitments to arbitrate.10 Although some detect continued judicial aversion 
to arbitration, pervasive hostility died generations ago, yet today’s Court often 
speaks as if such hostility were a daily threat to civil society. While championing 
this national policy, the Court has insisted that it is only enforcing contracts in 
accordance with contract law. But, although the Court’s holdings since the 
1980s may sometimes show greater fidelity to contracts than previously,11 there 
is a discernable gap between its rhetoric about that fidelity and what the Court 
actually does. 
The Court’s arbitration jurisprudence stimulates intense debate in a vast 
literature on many interrelated subjects. For example, critics object to the lack 
 
The question is one of intention, to be ascertained by the same tests that are applied to 
contracts generally. Courts are not at liberty to shirk the process of construction under the 
empire of a belief that arbitration is beneficent any more than they may shirk it if their belief 
happens to be the contrary. No one is under a duty to resort to these conventional tribunals, 
however helpful their processes, except to the extent that he has signified his willingness. 
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929). 
 6.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
 7.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 
251, 266 (2007) (“The paradigmatic commercial problem addressed by the FAA was that of a ‘shirking 
vendor,’ unwilling to pay a bill or perform a contractual obligation.”). 
 8.  See generally Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other 
Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004). 
 9.  E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995); Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). See discussion infra text 
accompanying notes 20–27 (discussing Moses Cone).  
 10.  E.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985); Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
 11.  The Court enforced arbitration contracts despite federal statutory protections previously seen 
to require litigation rather than arbitration. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985) (enforcing the arbitrability of antitrust claims under the Sherman Act); 
Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 224 (1987) (given national policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act can be arbitrated) (distinguishing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 477 (1989) (stating “agreement to 
arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 is enforceable and resolution of the claims only in a 
judicial forum is not required”) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (statutory claims generally). 
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of judicial attention given to the limits of arbitration,12 while proponents stress 
its virtues.13 Overlooked in this vast literature is the rhetoric–reality gap: the 
difference between the Court’s incantations about arbitration as contract—and 
its purported application of contract law—and the reality that its jurisprudence 
imposes on private parties, impinges on freedom both of contract and from 
contract, intrudes upon state contract law, and changes and distorts actual 
contract-law doctrine. This article documents that gap and explores its causes 
and consequences. 
The most likely cause can be stated simply: a national policy favoring 
arbitration over litigation and federal law over state law is constitutionally 
suspect unless based on voluntary assent of the people, meaning a basis in 
contract; but contracts that choose state law or that channel disputes into 
litigation instead of arbitration are incongruent with that policy and disfavored. 
The rhetoric of contracts is a device to portray the national policy as legitimate, 
even while departures from the rhetoric in practice are necessary to implement 
the policy. After first documenting the rhetoric–reality gap, this article explores 
this and other possible explanations for it, before considering why the gap 
matters, highlighting costs to judicial legitimacy and doctrinal coherence, and 
noting how it gives contract law a bad name. 
II 
DOCUMENTING THE RHETORIC–REALITY GAP 
It is well known that, in pivotal cases in recent decades, courts applied the 
Supreme Court’s early interpretation of the FAA to hold that virtually all 
arbitration agreements in most contracts are governed by federal law. Most 
famously, in Southland Corp v. Keating,14 the Court found that the FAA was a 
substantive statute establishing federal law, also applicable in state courts,15 and 
 
 12.  E.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call 
for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 
25 PACE L. REV. 1 (2004); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81 
(1992); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional Mandate?, 26 PACE L. 
REV. 73 (2005); Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 
(2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 757 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 75 
(2004); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer 
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 (1997);  David S. Schwartz, 
Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2010). 
 13.  E.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004); 
Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular 
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006). Additional examples of 
aspects of these scholarly debates are noted in an online version of this paper. 
 14.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 15.  This amounted to a functional overruling of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 
(1956), which viewed the FAA as procedural, not substantive.  
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preempts any state law that obstructs the FAA’s objectives,16 which the Court 
said announced “a national policy favoring arbitration.”17 Less appreciated, 
though, is how the Court’s jurisprudence since then increasingly eclipses the 
role of contracts and contract law with a radically different body of law. 
Although the Court insists it is simply enforcing contracts and applying contract 
law,18 its rhetoric about that has escalated while its fidelity has proportionally 
declined. Often the rhetoric–reality gap is vast and can appear to reflect 
conscious choice, though sometimes it appears to be a simple misunderstanding 
of contract law.19 In any event, the species of law the Court actually applies is so 
 
 16.  Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. In Southland, franchisees filed a class action lawsuit against a 
franchisor asserting various theories, including violations of state franchise statutes. The company 
invoked an arbitration clause in each of the contracts. California courts debated whether arbitration 
applied to the statutory violation claim because a related state statute rendered invalid any contract 
term that might waive statutory protections of franchisees. The Supreme Court declared that the FAA 
applied and preempted the California law because it “undercut the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements.” Id. 
 17.  The Court began making such bold statements in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. 
1 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 20–23, and has exuberantly repeated them for 
decades.  Only two limitations appear: the contract must be within the statute’s scope, principally 
involving commerce, and an agreement to arbitrate is subject to any grounds in law or equity as would 
invalidate any contract. The Court wrote: this “broad principle of enforceability” of agreements to 
arbitrate should not be “subject to any additional limitations under state law.” Southland. The Court 
claimed to find support for its sweeping expansion in the legislative history of the FAA, but scholars 
challenge its accuracy. See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT §10.53 (1994) (calling it a “pillar of sand”). Justice O’Connor dissented, objecting 
to federalizing this field of law. She stressed that the FAA and kindred state statutes had long been 
understood by contracts law scholars as procedural, not substantive, leaving contract law intact. 
Southland, 465 U.S. at 27 n.13 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 6 S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 368 (rev. ed. 1938)). Though O’Connor ultimately capitulated to the Court’s 
persistence, citing stare decisis, Allied-Bruce, discussed infra, the results continue to be debated. 
Compare Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 
(opining that Southland was fundamentally erroneous and has caused extensive damage to arbitration 
law and practice) with Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative 
History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002). Though many opinions 
and Justices have forged headlong into federal preemption of state law in this field, Justice Thomas, 
devotee of federalism, steadfastly dissents from preemption; Justice Scalia often echoes the objection 
but has retreated somewhat; Justice O’Connor once steadfastly opposed preemption but eventually 
relented. Chief Justice Rehnquist steered colleagues toward federalism. 
 18.  See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor’s Associates, 31 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1996) (“While the substance of the Court's arbitration decisions over the 
last twenty years has been remarkably faithful to the contractual approach, the Court's rhetoric has 
been even more supportive of the principle that arbitration law is a part of contract law.”).  
 19.  A good example appears in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), which protested federalization but stressed stare decisis. Scalia suggested 
that for parties who had relied on Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), which he considered 
erroneous, “rescission of the contract for mistake of law would often be available.” Allied-Bruce, 513 
U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 616 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 152). The authorities Scalia cited for this proposition do not support the assertion—
nor would others. Contract law allows rescission based on mutual mistake of a material fact that is a 
basic assumption of a contract. It is not obvious that a binding precedent of the Supreme Court, later 
overruled, qualifies. An old-fashioned view even held that mistakes about law are not grounds to 
rescind a contract. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 679, § 9.2 (2d ed. 1990) (“Some courts 
have denied relief [in mistake of law cases but] the modern view is that the existing law is part of the 
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alien to actual contract law as to defy the repeated assurances that arbitration is 
fundamentally about contracts or contract law. 
A. Interpretive Presumptions and Limited Choice of Law 
Contract law’s tools to address ambiguity channel analysis into recognized 
categories, useful to determine such recurring matters as whether to admit 
extrinsic evidence to aid interpretation or whether parties manifested 
sufficiently definite intention to form a binding contract. Contract law does not 
take a stance on whether to treat ambiguous language to channel performance 
in any particular direction—though the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence rushes 
it headlong into that territory. 
In 1983, the Court invented a presumption favoring arbitration. Despite 
declaring that arbitration is contractual, Justice Brennan in Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.20 asserted that the FAA 
“requires a liberal reading of arbitration agreements” and “is a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state . . . policies to the contrary”21 and “establishes that, as 
a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”22 
Though such assertions do not exist in the common law of contracts,23 there 
are doctrinal grounds that could justify them. Among the methods of 
interpretation elaborated in Arthur Corbin’s definitive treatise, for example, 
these assertions could be classified as a method of contract construction in the 
public interest—stressing congruence not with particular intentions of specific 
parties but with general judicial notions of public policy.24 More generously, the 
Court might be seen as establishing a default rule to deal with ambiguity, at 
least in the sense that parties can avoid the result by avoiding ambiguity.25 But 
the Court did not provide any such analysis. Indeed, neither the Moses Cone 
Court’s rhetoric about contracts nor its presumption was relevant to the issue 
 
state of facts at the time of agreement. Therefore, most courts will grant relief for such a mistake, as 
they would for any other mistake of fact.”) But what’s wrong with Justice Scalia’s statement is not 
about the difference between a mistake of law or fact. It is about the state of the law existing at the time 
of contract formation. At that time, the parties did not mistakenly apprehend the state of the law. 
Under Scalia’s model, they were not mistaken at all. The Court was mistaken. 
 20.  460 U.S. 1 (1983).  
 21.  Id. at 24 (quoted in, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002)).  
 22.  Id. at 24–25 (quoted in, e.g., Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 
(2010); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995)). 
 23.  See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 704–705 (1996) (noting how foreign these ideas are to 
contract law). 
 24.  See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 550.  
 25.  See Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen 
Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 29, 32, 34 (2003); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 45–58 (noting Justice Breyer’s attempts to defend some of the Court’s jurisprudence using 
contract law’s default-rule theory).  
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the Court faced.26 Even so, the dicta influenced the Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence, simultaneously declaring freedom of contract while imposing a 
national policy favoring arbitration.27 
For a few years, it remained possible for parties to opt out of the FAA and 
choose the law of a particular state, as suggested by 1989’s Volt Information 
Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford University.28 This case addressed a construction 
contract naming California the applicable law. The relevant statute allowed 
courts to stay arbitration pending litigation among third parties in order to 
avoid the risk of potentially inconsistent rulings on like facts. Amid a payment 
dispute, the contractor wanted to arbitrate, but the owner wanted to litigate 
against the contractor and others not party to the arbitration agreement. In a 
rare and never-repeated show of restraint, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
California court’s ruling for the owner. Federal policy favors arbitration and 
requires interpreting contracts accordingly, but there is no policy or rule about 
particular arbitration procedures.29 For the same reasons, state law was not 
preempted, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion concluded. 
Volt’s respect for contract and choice of law was short-lived, however, 
truncated in a nearly identical case six years later, Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc.30 A standard-form securities-brokerage contract chose 
New York law and directed arbitration under industry rules. After customers 
won an arbitration award of punitive damages, the broker wanted it vacated 
because, under New York law, arbitrators lacked the authority to award 
punitive damages.31 The Court refused, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, saying 
the contract did not manifest intention to include New York’s law limiting 
arbitrators’ power to award punitive damages. The Court perceived a conflict 
between the choice of New York law, so limiting arbitrator power, and the 
securities arbitrator’s rules allowing punitive awards.32 In fact, there was no 
conflict. The choice of New York law could easily mean no punitive damages 
could be awarded in arbitrations that the contract said would be used to resolve 
disputes. Indeed, that was the brokerage firm’s simple and compelling 
argument, which would be deferential to New York law and faithful to the 
contract. 
Though stating that arbitration is a matter of contracts and contract law, the 
Court instead chose a convoluted approach that first created ambiguities in the 
 
 26.  The issues concerned the finality and appealability of judgments. 
 27.  See Sternlight, supra note 23, at 660–61, 674 (“[T]he Court significantly recharacterized the 
policy and purpose of the FAA, proclaiming the myth that commercial arbitration . . . should be 
favored regardless of the parties' intentions.”).  
 28.  489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 29.  Id. at 477. 
 30.  514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
 31.  See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 834 (N.Y. 1976) (“The law does not and should 
not permit private persons to submit themselves to punitive sanctions of the order reserved to the 
State.”).  
 32.  Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52.  
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contract and then applied federal arbitration jurisprudence, along with a 
modicum of state contract law, to resolve them. Standard contract-law 
principles33 and conflict-of-laws rules34 hold that a choice of law incorporates 
into a contract the law of the named jurisdiction—including rules barring 
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. But the Court decided that a 
choice of law could mean less than that and that the relevant law’s scope could 
be limited, including by ignoring arcane rules like a state law denying 
arbitrators the power to award punitive damages. Presto: the contract contained 
an ambiguity.35 
To resolve the ambiguity, the Court used three principles. The first was a 
fair rendering of contract law, construing ambiguities against the drafter, the 
brokerage.36 The second was a strained rendering of another contract-law 
principle, harmonizing all terms of a contract, which the Court thought required 
denying effect to part of the New York law to uphold a broader scope of the 
arbitration clause. But the opposite reading is equally consistent with that 
principle. The Court’s third, and most striking, ground was the expanding 
federal arbitration law hatched in Moses Cone: “[A]mbiguities as to the scope 
of the arbitration clause [are] resolved in favor of arbitration.”37 The upshot is 
to require crystal clarity on terms restricting arbitration power, even in a 
standard-form adhesion contract.38 The common law requires no such clarity, 
and it is a stretch to contend that the Court’s interpretive gymnastics are merely 
supplying a default rule that parties can readily reverse at will. Worse, a basic 
principle of contract law is to interpret similar contracts similarly, yet 
Mastrobuono does not square with Volt. Mastrobuono silently overruled Volt—
and, thus, diminished respect for states, contracts, and contract law—putting the 
Court’s novel national policy favoring arbitration ahead of the country’s longer-
standing tradition favoring freedom of contract. 
The Court’s 1995 Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson39 opinion completed 
the diminution of parties’ abilities to choose the applicable law—despite the 
 
 33.  See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15.11 (Richard A. Lord 
ed., 4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter WILLISTON, CONTRACTS]. 
 34.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186 cmt. b; 187(1); 187(3) cmt. b, c, h; cmt. 
a–j, Reporter's Note; 207.  
 35.  In dicta, the Court suggested that, if the contract were silent about punitive damages, silence 
would manifest no intention to bar them and they would be allowed because the FAA would preempt 
New York’s law barring them. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 59. Why this is so is not clear. The Court 
assumed that a state law limiting remedies available in arbitration was anti-arbitration, unsurprising 
given the Court’s enthusiasm for expansive readings of the FAA. But such a law is not obviously anti-
arbitration. Punitive damages are allowed in tort actions but not for breach of contract, and there are 
considerable differences between procedural and substantive rules of law on the one hand and the law 
of remedies on the other.  
 36.  For the two contract-law principles, the Court rightly drew upon state law (of New York, the 
applicable law selected in the contract, as well as of Illinois, where the contract was formed), along with 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62–63. 
 37.  Id. at 62.  
 38.  See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, supra note 33, § 15.11. 
 39.  513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
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Court’s rhetoric stressing freedom of contract. Justice Breyer’s opinion 
addressed the FAA’s scope, capturing contracts that “evidenc[e] a transaction 
involving [interstate] commerce.”40 The issue was whether to read this as a 
directive from Congress about the population of contracts within its reach or as 
a reference to parties’ intentions about the scope of the deals they make. The 
case concerned a contract between a homeowner and a termite-protection 
provider. The Alabama Supreme Court denied that the FAA applied, 
considering the local nature of the contract and lack of any indication that the 
parties contemplated the transaction involving interstate commerce.41 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, deciding that “contemplation of the 
parties” is not the test for whether the FAA applies.42 The Court instead stated 
a test solely based on its declarations about what constitutes interstate 
commerce. It took this position by reaffirming Southland’s preemption a decade 
earlier, despite twenty state attorneys general filing amicus briefs to overrule 
it.43 The Court invoked stare decisis and the statute’s recently discovered 
national policy favoring arbitration. But the ruling gets contract law backwards. 
Contract law is all about contemplation of parties. Aside from narrow technical 
corners such as the statute of frauds,44 contract law is not about statutory 
directives channeling agreements into baskets for legislatively ordained 
treatment or courts setting default rules that parties are not allowed to change. 
Despite stern proclamations that its arbitration jurisprudence is all about 
contracts and contract law, the Court curtailed private autonomy to opt out of 
the Court’s national policy in favor of state law. 
B. Clarity of Intention 
Even in the rare cases when the Court tries to imagine what the contracting 
parties actually intended, or would have intended had they thought about an 
issue, its national policy retains a strong presence. The result is jurisprudence 
ringing of classical contract-law rhetoric worked into forms that make contract 
law a tool of social control. For example, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan,45 the Court addressed an agreement between a company and a 
securities firm containing an arbitration clause. A dispute had arisen between 
individuals who had not signed the agreement, who wished to litigate, and the 
securities firm, which wanted to arbitrate. At issue was whether a court or 
 
 40.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265.  
 41.  As a result, Alabama law applied, which then barred arbitration. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. 
Dobson, 628 So.2d 354 (Ala. 1993). 
 42.  See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 266 (“For several reasons, this ‘commerce in fact’ interpretation 
is more faithful to the statute than the ‘contemplation of the parties’ test adopted below and in other 
courts.”). 
 43.  See id. at 272 (“[W]e find it inappropriate to reconsider [Southland, which] is by now well-
established law.”); supra text accompanying note 14. 
 44.  Even such technical statutory directives are subject to considerable ameliorating doctrines, 
such as part performance. See infra note 113. 
 45.  514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
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arbitrator decides if the arbitration clause governs. Reciting standard rhetoric, 
the Court said that determination “turns upon what the parties agreed about 
that matter,”46 usually by applying “ordinary state-law principles that govern the 
formation of contracts.”47 Having recited the rhetoric, the Court retreated with 
an “important qualification”[:] courts cannot assume parties agreed to arbitrate 
such questions absent “clear and unmistakable” evidence of that intention.48 
The holding in First Options creates a special rule of federal arbitration 
jurisprudence alien to contract law: amid ambiguity about who decides whether 
an arbitration clause governs, doubts are resolved in favor of the courts. That 
special rule differs from the Court’s special rule of arbitration interpretation, 
invented in Moses Cone and extended in Mastrobuono, resolving ambiguities in 
the scope of a clause in favor of arbitration. Justice Breyer distinguished the 
cases using hypothetical-bargain analysis popular among contract-law 
theorists.49 He supposes that parties to agreements with arbitration clauses 
“likely gave at least some thought to the scope of arbitration” so that, given a 
national policy favoring arbitration, the Court demands clarity to show parties 
did not intend arbitration—as in Moses Cone and Mastrobuono.50 In contrast, 
“who (primarily) should decide arbitrability” is “rather arcane” and “[a] party 
often might not focus upon that question.”51 After reverting to contract 
rhetoric—under “the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those 
issues it has specifically agreed to submit to arbitration”52—the Court insisted 
on “clear and unmistakable” evidence of that intent, inventing a standard alien 
to contract law and of such limited use in law generally as to bewilder rather 
than enlighten.53 
Despite the attempt at using contract theory’s hypothetical-bargain analysis, 
its use underscores weaknesses in the Court’s jurisprudence, not strengths in 
Breyer’s engagement. The analysis supposes that people forming contracts with 
arbitration clauses make degrees of calculation about matters closely related. 
The Court does not justify its belief that there are significant differences 
between whether an issue will be resolved by arbitration and whether a court or 
arbitrator decides fights over that. Both are arcane. Parties often will give 
neither issue the slightest thought. Those giving thought to one can as likely be 
supposed to have given thought to the other. The First Options Court’s analysis 
 
 46.  Id. at 943. 
 47.  Id. at 944.  
 48.  Id. (quoting a case from the context of labor arbitration, AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns 
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (refusing to compel arbitration of labor dispute though possibly 
within scope of collective bargaining agreement)). 
 49.  E.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991). 
 50.  First Options, 514 U.S. at 945 (internal quotation omitted).  
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  See id. at 944 (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability 
unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”). 
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also departed from contract law when applying its new test to the facts. In 
deciding that the reluctant parties had not “clearly and unmistakably” vested 
the arbitrator with decision-making power, the Court concentrated not on the 
terms of the agreement, but on post-contractual conduct.54 
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Court saw the obverse of First 
Options, finding requisite “clear and unmistakable” intent.55 A dispute under a 
brokerage contract requiring arbitration posed a threshold issue of whether an 
arbitrator or court should decide if, under industry arbitration rules, a time 
limitation for bringing claims applied or had run. As usual, the Court recited 
rhetoric (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required 
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit”)56 
then added qualifications (“[There is a] liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements”57 with a heightened clarity standard about the “who 
decides” issue58). The Court elaborated its hypothetical-bargain analysis from 
First Options, this time finding clear and unmistakable intent bound up in the 
contract’s structure and language. In this exercise, however, the Court drew 
inferences less about what parties would want under the common law of 
contracts, and more about what they would want given the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence—while making it no clearer what the imported and rarely-used 
concept of “clear and unmistakable” means. 
Again, the hypothetical-bargain analysis is a nice touch, but proves more 
rhetorical than real, as indicated by Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in 
Howsam. He stressed that “arbitration is a matter of contract”—and he really 
meant it.59 As the Court held in Volt, under the FAA, courts must enforce 
agreements to arbitrate just as they would enforce what Justice Thomas called 
“ordinary contracts”—in “accordance with their terms.”60 Volt’s holding directs 
courts to choice of law clauses in agreements containing arbitration clauses and 
tells courts to enforce them. The Howsam contract chose the law of New York, 
whose highest court construed a nearly identical agreement to mean the 
decision was for an arbitrator, not a court.61 Justice Thomas is thus clear: state 
contract law governs, not federal arbitration jurisprudence. On inspection, 
therefore, the Court’s Howsam opinion emerges as characteristically opaque: 
expressing fealty to contract law while advancing arbitration jurisprudence 
 
 54.  Id. at 946. 
 55.  537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 56.  Id. at 83. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  See id. (“Although the Court has also long recognized and enforced a ‘liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements,’ it has made clear that there is an exception to this policy: The 
question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of 
arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably 
provide otherwise.’” ) (internal citation omitted).  
 59.  Id. at 87 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. (citing Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1997)). 
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expressing a national policy favoring arbitration over freedom of contract. 
C. Federal Severing of Private Contracts 
The common law of contracts takes a contextual approach to determining 
the effects of one clause’s invalidity on the rest of a contract.62 The Court’s 
federal arbitration jurisprudence imposes a severability rule so that the 
existence of an arbitration clause—even in a fraudulent, illegal, or 
unconscionable bargain—leaves determinations of the bargain’s validity for 
arbitration, not the courts. The Court minted this tool in Prima Paint Co. v. 
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,63 in which a business buyer sued its seller 
to rescind a contract based on fraud, and the seller invoked the contract’s 
arbitration clause. The seller won because the Court made a stunning move: it 
severed the arbitration clause from the rest of the contract. The Court observed 
that the buyer challenged the contract as a whole as fraudulently induced, but 
did not specifically challenge the arbitration clause.64 So the arbitration clause 
stood, and the Court directed the fraud claim to arbitration.65 Nothing in the 
contract authorized the Court to do so, and the common law of contracts 
warrants the opposite. 
Despite controversy,66 the Court repeatedly embraces its severability 
invention. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,67 a borrower objected to 
usurious terms as illegal under Florida law, and the lender invoked an 
arbitration clause. The Florida Supreme Court held the entire contract void, 
including its arbitration clause.68 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing Prima 
Paint’s federal procedure to sever the arbitration clause from the rest of the 
contract. Justice Scalia also announced: “The issue of the contract’s validity is 
different from the issue whether any agreement . . . was ever concluded”69—
 
 62.  See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 679 § 5.7–5-9 (2d ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184; Mark Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. 
REV. 41, 42, 46–48 (1995).  
 63.  388 U.S. 395 (1967).  
 64.  Id. at 406. 
 65.  The basis for this invention of federal arbitration jurisprudence, which is not based on state 
contract law, was the FAA. Section 4 outlines procedures to compel arbitration and stay litigation—
when the court, after a hearing, is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the 
failure to comply therewith is not in issue.” 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). When reviewing an application to stay 
under FAA section 3, the Court found that section 3 limits the court’s consideration to issues “relating 
to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.” Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 (analyzing 
9 U.S.C. § 3 in light of 9 U.S.C. § 4).  
 66.  See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Prima Paint Pushed Compulsory Arbitration Under the Erie Train, 
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2007); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, 
and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 
SMU L. REV. 819 (2003); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107 (2007). For a resounding defense of the severability 
doctrine, based in part on the policies favoring arbitration, but mostly on earnest attempts to anchor it 
in traditional contract-law doctrine, see also Rau, supra note 25.  
 67.  546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 68.  Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005). 
 69.  Cardegna, 546 U.S. at 442 n.1. 
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meaning essentially that courts can decide questions about contract formation, 
such as whether a party had contractual capacity. But nothing in contract law 
makes any such distinction to disempower courts to decide the legality of a 
contract. Buckeye thus sustains an invention of uncertain congruity with 
contract law, and of certain incongruity with the Court’s stern declarations that 
it never holds people to arbitration agreements to which they did not assent.70 
The apotheosis of the separation of arbitration jurisprudence from contract 
law using severability is Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.71 An employee-at-
will signed an employment application containing nothing but an agreement to 
arbitrate disputes and related rules, including a meta-clause directing that 
arbitration would resolve whether that agreement to arbitrate was valid. The 
employee sued for unlawful discrimination and alleged that the agreement was 
unconscionable because its arbitration rules were obnoxious. 
Justice Scalia took the familiar formula, starting with incantations: 
arbitration is a matter of contract; the FAA puts arbitration clauses on an equal 
footing with other contracts; courts must enforce arbitration agreements in 
accordance with their terms; and agreements to arbitrate are, like other 
contracts, subject to defenses “such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”72 
The rhetoric restated, the Court then applied federal arbitration jurisprudence, 
not contract law, and severed the clause. In a rare show of candor, however, the 
Court acknowledged that the source of its rule is federal arbitration 
jurisprudence.73 Despite that acknowledgement, the Court insisted that its 
holding “merely reflects the principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”74 
D. Dealing with Silence by Federal Judicial Fiat 
Contractual silence is a vexing problem in the common law that has at least 
twice bedeviled the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence as well. In Green 
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,75 Justice Breyer’s opinion returned to the issue 
of “who decides” and what “clear and unmistakable” intent means. The 
arbitration clause at issue in Bazzle was silent about whether arbitration may 
take the form of class arbitration. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that 
its contract law takes such silence to permit class arbitration.76 The U.S. 
 
 70.  E.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468 (1989).  
 71.  130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
 72.  Id. at 2776 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)) (citing 
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 443; Volt, 489 U.S. at 478).  
 73.  Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2780 n.4 (“The severability rule is a ‘matter of substantive federal 
arbitration law,’ and we have repeatedly ‘rejected the view that the question of “severability” was one 
of state law, so that if state law held the arbitration provision not to be severable a challenge to the 
contract as a whole would be decided by the court.’”).  
 74.  Id. at 2777 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003); Howsam, 537 U.S. 
at 83–85; First Options, 514 U.S. at 943).  
 75.  539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 76.  Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2003).  
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Supreme Court reversed because the state court wrongly thought that question 
was for the judiciary when—as a matter of federal arbitration jurisprudence, 
particularly in light of Howsam—it was for the arbitrator to decide (the Court 
finding “clear and unmistakable” party intention).77 
Bazzle confused people (as much of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence 
does). That confusion manifested when the Court chastised arbitrators for being 
confused and rebuked them for allegedly not following the law. Stolt-Neilsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.78 involved a commercial shipping 
contract with a standard arbitration clause. A customer wanted to use class 
arbitration to air allegations that the shipping company illegally fixed prices for 
many years. The two agreed that their contract did not say one way or the other 
whether class arbitration was authorized. So they asked arbitrators to rule on 
the meaning of that silence.79 The arbitrators held a hearing, took testimony, 
and researched the law and industry practice. Their written report concluded 
that the clause authorized class arbitration, citing the clause, custom in the 
shipping industry, and general arbitration practice plus contract law precedents 
from New York and elsewhere.80 The shipping company objected and sued to 
have that ruling vacated. 
The Court vacated the award, accusing the arbitrators of exceeding their 
power under the FAA.81 The Court recited the full litany of its incantations—
nearly every specimen of contract rhetoric the Court has used to characterize its 
arbitration jurisprudence since 1983: arbitration-clause interpretation is a 
matter of state contract law;82 “arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not 
coercion’”;83 the FAA’s purpose is to make arbitration clauses enforceable 
according to their terms;84 arbitrators derive power from contract;85 and 
arbitration procedures can be freely designed because arbitration is a 
consensual matter.86 Justice Alito then wrote that it is “clear from our 
precedents and the contractual nature of arbitration that courts and arbitrators 
give effect to these contractual limitations [and we] must not lose sight of the 
 
 77.  Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452. 
 78.  130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 79.  Id. at 1761.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. at 1770. Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA authorizes federal courts to vacate awards when 
arbitrators exceed their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).  
 82.  Stolt-Neilsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773. 
 83.  Id. (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
479 (1989)). 
 84.  Id. (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479; Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 
57, 58 (1995)).  
 85.  Id. at 1774 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1986); 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960)). 
 86.  Id. (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57) (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 
289 (2002); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); Volt, 489 U.S. at 479). 
Conspicuously, the Court failed to cite an opinion from its prior term contradicting its hyperbole about 
how important contracts and contract law really are in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009), discussed infra text accompanying notes 90–95. 
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purpose of the exercise: to give effect to the intent of the parties.”87 
Despite saying all of that, the Court never showed how a contract-law 
analysis would apply to the case or yield a result different from what the 
arbitrators reached under New York contract law. Instead, after acknowledging 
that sometimes it is appropriate to supply missing terms to agreements 
otherwise sufficiently definite to be binding,88 it simply declared that the 
difference between “arbitration” and “class arbitration” is too vast to imply 
such a term. This is not a statement of contract law, of course, but of federal-
arbitration-law opinion, for which the Court cited no authority. The Court’s 
thick and stirring rhetoric about its devotion to contract law makes its reliance 
on perceived differences between direct and class arbitration pale by 
comparison. 
E. The Death of Contract and the Denial of Death 
Under the common law of contracts, people are usually free to make 
bargains on any terms they wish and to have those terms enforced. That is the 
essence of freedom of contract. Contract law’s third-party-beneficiary doctrine 
recognizes that strangers may enforce contracts only in narrow circumstances 
when parties to contracts have manifested intention to grant them that right. 
This doctrine exquisitely illustrates a corollary principle called freedom from 
contract.89 The Court’s arbitration jurisprudence gives short shrift to both 
fundamental principles, though proclaiming devotion to them. 
In Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle,90 clients sued professional advisors after 
a tax shelter the advisors fashioned was held illegal. Contracts between the 
clients and a management firm had arbitration clauses; but the firm was 
bankrupt, so that party and its contracts were out of the case. Still, the advisors 
invoked those contracts, to which they were not parties, to seek a stay. Lower 
courts denied the stay given that the advisers were strangers to the contracts. In 
an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court reversed. 
The opinion begins with the familiar incantations—arbitration agreements 
are contracts that federal law puts on equal footing with other contracts, and 
state law governing contracts generally applies to determine what contracts are 
enforceable.91 It added that the FAA directs courts to stay litigation in the face 
of arbitration clauses found binding under state law.92 The Court declared that 
the lower courts erred in holding that strangers to contracts cannot obtain stays 
under arbitration clauses because, it said, state law allows “a contract to be 
enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through ‘assumption, piercing 
 
 87.  Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774–75.  
 88.  Id. at 1775 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979)). 
 89.  E.g., Richard Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Wither Consent?, 62 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1996). 
 90.  129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009). 
 91.  Id. at 1902. 
 92.  Id. 
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the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary 
theories, waiver and estoppel.’”93 
The Court did not explore how any of those theories could give the advisors 
rights against the clients under the latter’s agreements with the management 
firm. None of the listed theories work. The only theory the advisors asserted 
was estoppel, the equitable doctrine available to do justice when legal principles 
fail, but that was unlikely to be applicable on the facts. So the Court simply 
declared that third-party-beneficiary law might be a sufficient ground and 
reversed on that basis. But that was an even wilder stretch because there was no 
evidence that the clients intended for the advisers to have rights under their 
contracts with the management firm. Although state contract law on third-party 
beneficiaries varies slightly from state to state, all at minimum require the third 
party to prove that the contract parties intended them to have rights.94 The 
Court’s assertions that arbitration is a matter of contractual consent, not 
coercion, thus fall flat.95 
The clearest declaration of the death of contract in federal arbitration 
jurisprudence is Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.96 The Court in Hall 
Street declared that parties are not allowed by contract to supplement FAA 
grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards. The FAA states the grounds 
courts may invoke to vacate or modify an award, including fraud, arbitrator 
misconduct, or (as in Stolt-Neilsen) an arbitrator’s exceeding his powers.97 The 
parties in Hall Street provided by contract that awards under the arbitration 
agreement they assented to would be subject to judicial review for erroneous 
conclusions of law. The arbitrator drew such an erroneous conclusion, and the 
party it harmed sought judicial review. The Supreme Court refused to enforce 
 
 93.  Id. at 1902 (quoting WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:19, 183). 
 94.  Compare Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (applying Alabama 
law to require intention of the parties to benefit a stranger), abrogated on other grounds, Davis v. S. 
Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2002), with E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Rhone 
Poulenc Fiber & Resin, 269 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Delaware law to require not only 
intention to benefit but also either intention to make a gift or to discharge a debt and for that point to 
be a material part of the exchange). 
 95.  Nor could the Court avoid that criticism by blaming the statute, as it tried to do when writing: 
“If a written arbitration provision is made enforceable against (or for the benefit of) a third party under 
state contract law, the statute’s terms are fulfilled.” Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1902. Professors 
Stone and Bales put the point presciently in their casebook without adverting directly to Arthur 
Andersen, wondering whether third-party-beneficiary status should be determined by state contract law 
or by special federal law congruent with federal preemption and liberal federal-arbitration policy. See 
STONE & BALES, supra note 1, at 418. They ask if the federal presumption favoring arbitration 
commands that states grant third-party-beneficiary status “whenever there is a colorable claim” to that 
standing and then ask, poignantly, “If so, what happens to the bedrock principle that arbitration is 
grounded in consent of the parties?” Id. The Arthur Andersen case, like the dozen others considered in 
this article, raises the issue of whether that “bedrock principle” is more rhetorical than real.  
 96.  552 U.S. 576 (2008); see Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall 
Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2009) (“This decision constitutes arguably the most 
significant constraint on party autonomy in arbitration that the Court has imposed.”).  
 97.  9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see supra note 81 (summarizing grounds the FAA authorizes courts to use 
to vacate awards). 
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that contract, demolishing contractual freedom,98 despite forty years of 
proclaiming that its arbitration jurisprudence rests on contract and is intended 
to enforce contracts. The Court thus shows both the death of contract at its 
hands and its denial of that death. 
A final example is AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,99 in which the issue was 
whether California unconscionability law applies to “any contract” within the 
meaning of the FAA as the Court construes it. The case involved a form 
contract about which a consumer claimed a fraud of thirty dollars and sought to 
wage a class arbitration—which a contract clause barred. California contract 
law classified as unconscionable such procedurally adhesive clauses that can be 
used to prevent people from banding together to challenge crooked practices 
that involve stealing small sums from large numbers of people.100 The Court said 
the FAA preempted that contract law. 
The case showed that the Court’s rhetoric is at war with itself: rhetoric from 
pure nineteenth-century freedom of contract suggests upholding the bar 
because the clause is in the written agreement; rhetoric about state contract law 
suggests striking the bar because the written agreement is invalid. The Court’s 
opinion, however, was oblivious to this tension. Instead, the Court followed its 
usual course, offering an opinion rich with empty rhetoric about arbitration 
being a creature of contract. At the same time, the Court was more explicit than 
ever that what matters in these cases is the Court’s powerful national policy 
strongly favoring a particular form of arbitration over other methods of dispute 
resolution. 
The Court could not accept the validity of California contract law because it 
did not advance its favored national policy. Justice Scalia gave a new definition 
of that national policy, again combining two conflicting ideas while pretending 
they are in harmony: “to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
according to their terms, so as to facilitate informal, streamlined proceedings.”101 
The opinion fights tirelessly but unsuccessfully to prove that it has not made up 
this new version of the national policy. It struggles strenuously but 
unsuccessfully to persuade that there is no conflict between its devotion to 
arbitration and basic principles of Anglo-American contract law. 
The Court commits contradictions that manifest a lack of understanding of 
contract law and even life. Most strikingly, on one page Justice Scalia observes 
that consumer contracts are totally “adhesive” today;102 yet, on the very next 
page, he strikes the California law because the aggregate actions it ordains are 
 
 98. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905 
(2010) (demonstrating insurmountable obstacles facing people who wish to contract around the Court’s 
holding in the case). 
 99.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 100.  E.g., Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (reviewing and applying 
California unconscionability doctrine to arbitration clause in consumer-finance contract), vacated and 
remanded, 131 S.Ct. 2989 (2011). 
 101.  AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.  
 102.  Id. at 1750.  
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not “consensual.”103 The passages are oblivious to how difficult it is to conceive 
of an adhesion contract as consensual. There may be ways to reconcile these 
propositions, but it would require much-more-honest confrontation with the 
fact that it is the national policy favoring arbitration alone that is driving 
things—not contract, not freedom, not volition, and not consent. 
Nor did Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion address or appreciate the gap 
between what the Court says and what it does about contracts in its arbitration 
jurisprudence. It instead fights the majority on the statute’s purpose concerning 
arbitration as a national policy, on the differences between arbitration and 
litigation, and on the differences between direct and class arbitration.104 Only 
Justice Thomas, as usual, offered any serious effort to engage in contract-law 
discussion and analysis. He struggled to map the statute onto the law of 
contracts. He took the statutory text literally, though, treating the word 
“revocation” in its savings clause to recognize only those defenses to arbitration 
agreements that affect the making of a contract rather than its enforceability or 
validity.105 This enabled him to concur. Though flawed, it is a far better ground 
than the majority offered because it is faithful to contracts and contract law. 
III 
EXPLAINING AND ASSESSING THE RHETORIC–REALITY GAP 
The Supreme Court routinely says that the FAA and federal arbitration 
jurisprudence are a matter of contract law. There is some truth to such 
assertions, particularly when referring to the existence of a flicker of volition 
nodding toward arbitration for dispute resolution. But the Court’s rhetoric 
about contracts and contract law is more exuberant than the reality that 
dislodges contracts and contract law from their usual roles. And the problem is 
not limited to widely referenced contexts such as when consumers or employees 
sign adhesion contracts with boilerplate arbitration clauses that the Court 
nevertheless enforces. The Court likewise imposes its national policy favoring 
arbitration on commercial parties in arm’s-length negotiations using equally 
alluring rhetoric. Wonderment arises: What explains this gap and why might it 
matter? 
A. Doctrinal Explanations 
Scholars could defend the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence by 
reinterpreting it in different ways, loosely classifiable as doctrinal. Doctrinal 
explanations might assert that: (1) there is less difference than appears between 
rhetoric and reality, or between any gap the Court shows and gaps prevalent in 
other areas of law or the general law of contracts; or (2) contract law’s default 
rule theory explains the Court’s jurisprudence, including any perceived 
 
 103.  Id. at 1750–51. 
 104.  Id. at 1757–59. 
 105.  Id. at 1753–55. 
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differences between what it says and what it does. However, neither retelling of 
the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is compelling. Instead, the best doctrinal 
account is less an explanation than another anomaly requiring explanation: the 
Court’s rhetoric reflects nineteenth-century classical contract law, whereas its 
applications evince a caricature of late-twentieth-century, post-realist contract 
law that Grant Gilmore called “contorts” in his famously enigmatic book, The 
Death of Contract.106 
1. Rhetoric and Reality 
The rhetoric–reality gap may simply reflect similar gaps that are pervasive in 
law. Courts roundly intone one policy tradition of grand and enduring appeal, 
such as tort law’s “no duty to rescue,” then announce an exception, in a process 
that—if repeated enough—yields the familiar result of the exception swallowing 
the rule. Episodes like that recur in law. But they still tend to be special cases 
rather than routine. Rhetoric–reality gaps remain an anomaly to highlight, 
explain, or criticize—as this article does—rather than representing the norm to 
be expected. In the case of the Court’s talk versus its actions, it repeatedly 
asserts a singular rule—freedom of contract—then often generates applications 
at odds with that. At that general level, the gap is difficult to deny. 
At a more particular level, it is possible to claim that a peculiarly vibrant 
rhetoric–reality gap pervades contract law. Besides freedom of contract, judges 
routinely proclaim mantras in contract law supporting such principles as that no 
punitive damages are allowed, that mutuality is required, and that party 
autonomy is the standard. Yet judges do periodically award damages greater 
than necessary to compensate for breach of contract (such as to “punish willful 
breach”); case analysis shows that mutuality is often lacking when binding 
contracts are found; and party autonomy has faded into the deep background 
amid the past century’s proliferation of standardized forms. To that extent, the 
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence may replicate national contract-law 
jurisprudence. 
But there are both qualitative and quantitative differences. The Court has 
fielded only a handful of arbitration cases annually in the past two generations, 
and the Justices do not rotate very much. The same dozen people have written 
about a score of opinions. They can be expected to produce opinions coherent 
in rhetoric and reality more readily than a welter of far-flung courts in many 
jurisdictions facing a bewildering variety of fact patterns, contending equities, 
and varying judicial staffing. Yet the small coterie of Justices has not produced 
such a coherent body of opinions, leaving a gap more pronounced than appears 
elsewhere in the law of contracts. 
On the other hand, a variation on this explanation might question whether 
the gap portrayed in part II is exaggerated because of contract law’s breadth 
and capaciousness. After all, contract law governs an infinite variety of deals. 
That often requires tailoring general doctrines to particular contexts, such as 
 
 106.  GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
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transactions in goods, land sales, construction contracts, or consumer 
exchanges. The Court’s adaptation of general contract law to the special context 
of arbitration may simply advance a grand tradition—still about freedom of 
contract, warranting the rhetoric—but with applications that differ slightly from 
applications in other contexts. Some of the Court’s rules may be explained in 
these terms, particularly its rules for interpreting ambiguous expressions—
construing doubtful clauses to favor arbitration though insisting on clear and 
unmistakable evidence of intent to have arbitrators decide threshold 
questions.107 
But many of the Court’s arbitration-law doctrines depart from general 
contract law so considerably that they achieve a different purpose—one in the 
service of social control, not freedom of contract. Examples are the Court’s 
announcing federal rules in Allied-Bruce declaring which contracts are within 
the FAA’s scope,108 expanding the enforcement rights of strangers to contracts 
under Arthur Andersen,109 and denying party autonomy to contract for judicial 
review of arbitration awards as stated in Hall Street.110 The rules more clearly 
advance the purpose of a national policy committed to arbitration than a 
national policy committed to freedom of contract—while denying doing that—
as evidenced in the Court’s approach to choice of law clauses in such cases as 
Mastrobuono111 and in its severability rule stated in cases such as Prima Paint, 
Buckeye, and Rent-A-Center.112 Thus, there remains something unusual about 
the rhetoric–reality gap in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence requiring 
further explanation. 
2. Default-Rule Theory 
Another doctrinal explanation for the Court’s jurisprudence, and its gap 
between rhetoric and reality, reinterprets the jurisprudence in terms of default-
rule theory in contract law. This framework appreciates that no contract can be 
perfectly complete given transaction costs and limitations of human foresight. 
One function of contract law is to provide rules that apply when a contract does 
not address an issue or that apply no matter what, courtesy of public policy. 
Most contract-law default rules can be changed (such as risk of loss to goods in 
 
 107.  Compare Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), with First 
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). See supra text accompanying notes 20–27 
(discussing Moses Cone); supra text accompanying notes 45–54 (discussing First Options).  
 108.  See supra text accompanying notes 39–44 (discussing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)). 
 109.  See supra text accompanying notes 90–95 (discussing Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. 
Ct. 1896 (2009)). 
 110.  See supra text accompanying notes 96–98 (discussing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
552 U.S. 576 (2008)). 
 111.  See supra text accompanying notes 30–38 (discussing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995)). 
 112.  See supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (discussing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)); supra text accompanying notes 71–75 (discussing Rent-A-Center, W., 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)). 
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transit or the destruction of a contract’s subject matter); the few that cannot 
(such as the compensation principle or the statute of frauds) exhibit a strong 
and readily identifiable rationale consistent with fundamental principles of 
contract law and accompanied by ameliorating doctrines to avoid harsh results 
in particular cases.113 
The strongest examples supporting the default-rule explanation of the 
Court’s jurisprudence are the Court’s express statements of this approach in 
cases such as Howsam and First Options. In those cases, the Court is explicit in 
using hypothetical-bargain analysis and stating that the Court’s goal is to “align 
probable expectations with the understood comparative expertise of 
institutional arbitrators in interpreting their own rules.”114 But, aside from being 
rare for that feature, the talk remains more rhetorical rather than real; the rest 
of the Court’s arbitration rules tend to be statements of judicial fiat in the name 
of the national policy favoring arbitration, without regard to presumed or 
probable party intent. 
Exquisitely, Allied-Bruce denies that party contemplations matter when 
determining whether the Court’s national policy or state law should govern, 
favoring a determination based on what the Court declares to involve interstate 
commerce.115 Another strong example negating the default-rule explanation is 
the Court’s express denial of this approach in Hall Street. Interpreting the FAA, 
the Court refused to validate a contract clause authorizing a court to review 
whether an arbitration award rested on erroneous legal premises.116 This denial 
of freedom of contract illustrates how default-rule theory simply crumbles as an 
explanation of the Court’s jurisprudence and its rhetoric–reality gap.117 
It is also difficult to explain cases such as Mastrobuono in terms of default-
rule theory. That case denied effect to a choice-of-law clause selecting New 
York law when the Court found that state’s laws regarding arbitrators’ powers 
unappealing. Portraying this as a matter of default-rule theory might begin by 
asserting that choice-of-law clauses choose only among state laws, not between 
state and federal law, because both of the latter are sovereign in the states. But 
if the Court has produced an appealing contribution to the law governing 
arbitration, authentically about contract law, then it has also created a choice 
between co-equal governing laws, such as New York versus federal. Yet cases 
 
 113.  For example, exceptions from the nominally immutable statute-of-frauds default rule include 
the part-performance doctrine and, in some states, promissory estoppel; exceptions from the nominally 
immutable default rule against stipulated remedies that impose penalties for breach include the 
alternative-performance doctrine. 
 114.  See supra text accompanying notes 45–58 (noting Justice Breyer’s attempts to defend some of 
the Court’s jurisprudence using contract law’s default-rule theory).  
 115.  See supra text accompanying notes 39–44 (discussing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)). 
 116.  See supra text accompanying notes 96–98 (discussing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
552 U.S. 576 (2008)). 
 117.  Some language toward the end of the Hall Street opinion obliquely suggests some possibility of 
altering the Court’s rule by reference to general principles of state law discussed in Volt, but that escape 
route is neither explicated nor highly reliable.  
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such as Mastrobuono do not promote free party choice over whether a 
particular state’s law or the Court’s FAA law should govern. That is not exactly 
consistent with default-rule theory. 
Arthur Andersen cannot be squared with default-rule theory. The opinion 
expands the Court’s presumption favoring arbitration by finding that parties 
who signal will to arbitrate anything agree to arbitrate everything. Conceiving 
of the case in default-rule terms, Professor Rau suggests this analogy: If you 
expressly agree to arbitrate about the sale of fruit, then you implicitly agree to 
arbitrate about whether the sale of tomato is a sale of fruit.118 The analogy may 
be persuasive in principle, but does not justify Arthur Andersen. 
The question in Arthur Andersen was whether a party may be compelled to 
arbitrate an issue, not against a party it made that agreement with, but against a 
party with whom it made no such agreement. That is not analogous to the fruit–
tomato example. Indeed, in compelling that arbitration, the Court distinguished 
its rhetoric suggesting it does not compel people to arbitrate issues they did not 
agree to arbitrate. The result is greater reluctance to compel arbitration about 
classifying tomatoes under an agreement to arbitrate about fruit and a greater 
willingness to compel arbitration against a stranger to a contract so long as that 
contract had an arbitration clause.119 
Even if the default-rule theory of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence 
retains some purchase, another weakness in that conception is how many of the 
Court’s default rules tend to be sticky. True, if classified as default rules, some 
are easy to contract around, such as avoiding ambiguity or using an adjective to 
modify the word arbitration if intending to authorize particular forms of 
arbitration, such as class arbitration. But it is much more difficult to circumvent 
other default rules, such as by selecting a law other than the FAA or by 
providing that no third parties can enforce an arbitration clause. 
The logic, if not the language, of the Court’s opinions indicate a stickiness 
not common in general contract-law default rules. As a contrast, consider such 
routine subjects as the default rule setting a reasonable time, which may be 
contracted around simply by stating dates and times. The Court’s arbitration 
default rules, as a class, are more akin to warranty law that can only be 
disclaimed by following particular procedures, especially using unambiguous 
and specific language.120 These rules are more familiar in the law of torts than 
 
 118.  See Alan Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of Party “Consent,” 24 ARB. INT’L 199 
(2008). 
 119.  Professor Rau allows that no party can compel another to arbitrate who has not agreed to any 
arbitration whatsoever. But, as in First Options, that just reemphasizes the national-policy thumb on 
this scale to determine the default rule. Agree to anything, and you agree to everything, even if that 
default rule differs from standard third-party-beneficiary law. Again, the Court insists it is merely 
following and applying contract law, here third-party-beneficiary doctrine, and not making a special 
default rule for “signatories in arbitration.” But this is not a contract or contract law, despite rhetoric. It 
is mandatory obligation, more akin to contorts, as discussed in the next subsection. 
 120.  The history of warranty is a central story in the history of the relationship between contract 
and tort law.  
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they are in the law of contracts, inviting a final doctrinal view of the Court’s 
jurisprudence better classified as contorts than contracts. 
3. Contorts 
A final way to classify the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is as classical in 
rhetoric, but post-realist in application. The Court reflects two contending 
strands of contract law, one exuberantly and classically reflecting autonomy, the 
other consciously and modernly injecting a role for society in contracts and 
contract law. Contract law is rooted deeply in party autonomy and freedom and 
was historically unshackled by status-based impositions that distinguish contract 
from tort law. These deep roots and this vital distinction loom large in the 
Court’s rhetoric about arbitration jurisprudence. Another view of contracts 
recognizes its distinction from tort as far more blurry and its roots in party 
autonomy often overstated. This view was charmingly dubbed “contorts” by 
Grant Gilmore in his controversial caricature of modern contract law, The 
Death of Contract.121 This concept is more congruent with the Court’s real 
applications in its arbitration jurisprudence, rhetoric aside. 
In this interpretation, autonomy is not so much an exercise of preference 
given the contexts and purposes of people, but an interpretation of action 
limited by the contexts and purposes of the rules. The Court is not merely 
heeding old-fashioned principles in the common law of contracts—the Court is 
not applying the common law of contracts, but a special brand of contract law it 
has developed for arbitration in light of its declared national policy favoring 
arbitration. It is a national policy that supersedes values embedded in the 
common law of contracts (volition, autonomy, freedom of and from contract). 
There is thus a gap between the Court’s rhetoric (all about these venerable 
values) and the reality (heavily influenced by a superseding national policy), 
which remains to be explained. 
B. Legalistic Accounts 
A likely explanation for the rhetoric–reality gap is that it is a tool to cover 
an inherent conflict in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. The Court insists 
that there is a national policy favoring arbitration over litigation. That entails a 
policy disfavoring trial by jury as guaranteed by the Constitution along with 
other procedural due process.122 To validate that national policy requires 
respecting such constitutional rights and associated traditions. It demands some 
voluntary basis to direct people to arbitration instead of the courthouse. That 
means contracts.123 But, if parties have true freedom of contract, they could 
 
 121.  GILMORE, supra note 106. 
 122.  See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due 
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 123.  Even with contractual assent to arbitration, state action may be present in the process to 
warrant imposition of constitutional rights and due-process norms. See Richard C. Reuben, Public 
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997). 
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interfere with that national policy. People could freely agree to levels of judicial 
review over arbitration awards,124 be free from strangers asserting mandates to 
arbitrate disputes,125 and easily escape the clutches of federal law, in favor of 
their chosen state law.126 Allowing such a full range of contractual freedom 
would impede a national policy favoring arbitration. The tension thus induces 
rhetoric about contracts. 
Similarly, when insisting on a national policy favoring arbitration, the 
Justices know that implementing this policy entails the federalization of an area 
of law traditionally reposed in the states. This is true for all Justices, whatever 
their usual view on the relative powers of federal and state government. Such a 
move defies federalism. States’ rights are thus at stake in the Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence. To promote the respectability of an assertion of national policy, 
it helps to maintain the policy’s links to state-law prerogatives. That means 
contract law. But, again, too much deference to state law would undermine a 
national policy. That tension induces rhetoric about state contract law. It is 
therefore easy to understand why the Court would embrace the rhetoric of 
contracts and of contract law while advancing its national policy favoring 
arbitration. 
On the other hand, maneuvering to secure legitimacy under constitutionally 
pedigreed access to justice or federalism impulses does not require a rhetoric–
reality gap as wide as the cases reveal. Finding requisite citizen volition to 
warrant rechanneling disputes from litigation to arbitration can be done within 
a federal arbitration regime expressly unmoored from contract law. Gestures 
towards federalism could be made without rhetorical exaggeration by showing 
such linkages between the Court’s jurisprudence and state law that do exist. 
Certainly, the rhetoric–reality gap as to contract law does not cure the 
federalism objection, and the rhetoric about fidelity to contracts is not a perfect 
disguise for the coercive aspects of the jurisprudence. 
An additional explanation for the rhetoric–reality gap is the statutory basis 
of the Court’s jurisprudence. The FAA was motivated by judicial reluctance to 
enforce contracts. The text of the statute speaks of contracts. The Court’s talk 
of anchoring its application of the statute in contract law thus makes obvious 
sense. But it does not explain why the Court fashioned a separate federal 
arbitration law, distinct from the common law of contracts, and it certainly does 
not explain the rhetoric–reality gap. The choice to develop a different body of 
law is explicable, ultimately and simply, by the Court’s determination that there 
 
That prospect ups the ante favoring contractual rhetoric.  
 124.  Contra Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). See supra text 
accompanying notes 96–98. 
 125.  Contra Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009). See supra text 
accompanying notes 90–95.  
 126.  Contra Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). See supra text accompanying notes 39–44 
(discussing Allied-Bruce); supra text accompanying notes 30–38 (discussing Mastrobuono).  
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should be a national policy favoring arbitration. Once that policy was declared, 
a new set of tools, not merely those found in general contract law, was necessary 
to implement it. The rhetoric compensates for the need to be faithful not only 
to the statute—and the Constitution and federalism—but to the Court’s 
determination of the national policy it expresses. Again, though a partial 
explanation for the gap, this legalistic account is not definitive. After all, it 
suggests that the Justices consciously cultivate the rhetoric–reality gap. But 
evidence is scarce to support such disingenuous calculation. So the legalistic 
accounts are probably incomplete and further explanation warranted. 
C. Institutional Stories 
A credible institutional explanation for the rhetoric–reality gap is the 
Justices’ lack of interest in the subtleties required when grappling with contract 
law in the arbitration context. One version of this explanation suggests that the 
Court may think it is enforcing contracts according to the common law of 
contracts, supplemented with federal rules that are also contractual. The 
Justices occasionally cite contract-law authority.127 In clear cases of departures, 
especially with its severability rule, the Court stresses forthrightly that it is 
developing and applying substantive arbitration law based on the FAA.128 In 
others, such as the Court’s presumptions concerning the question of “who 
decides” whether an issue is subject to arbitration, it even uses the tools of 
hypothetical bargain to struggle with contract-law terrain.129 But those citations, 
admissions, and struggles are sparse. Most of the Court’s citations in its 
arbitration opinions are to its own previous opinions, not to material on the 
common law of contracts or state contract law. 
Another version of this explanation is more fundamental—that the Court is 
not equipped to attend to the required subtleties of the common law of 
contracts. There is a good deal of evidence to support this take. The Court has 
historically acknowledged its comparative disadvantage in matters of the 
common law, including contracts, which can vary among the states.130 The Court 
has few occasions to immerse the Justices in the common law of contracts 
because it is rarely the court of last resort to address contract-law issues. This 
setting contrasts with the Court’s routine and deep engagement in the fields 
that form most of its docket, such as constitutional law, federal courts, 
 
 127.  Examples from principal cases discussed in this article include a few citations to the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, occasional references to Williston on Contracts or Corbin on 
Contracts, and the odd invocation of state-high-court contracts opinions. 
 128.  E.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. 
v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). See supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (discussing Buckeye); supra 
text accompanying notes 71–753 (discussing Rent-A-Center). 
 129.  E.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). See supra text accompanying notes 45–54 (discussing First Options); 
supra text accompanying notes 55–620 (discussing Howsam). 
 130.  See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (describing the Court as an 
“‘outsider[]’ lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction”).  
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administrative law, and statutory and regulatory interpretation. Leading 
students of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence detect a comparative lack of 
serious interest in the subject.131 
The most cynical explanation for the rhetoric–reality gap is that the 
judiciary is a primary beneficiary of the Court’s discernment of a national policy 
favoring arbitration. Federal judges, especially Justices of the Supreme Court, 
may be uncomfortable as primary marketers of such a national policy. The 
Court might just find it easier to wrap the product and pitch in slogans of 
contracts and contractual freedom—while exercising the powerful leverage of 
federal law to guarantee the product’s marketing success. 
Finally, it is difficult to attribute the rhetoric–reality gap to ideology, since 
all the Justices contribute to the gap. Indeed, scholars stress that the Justices 
share the perception of a national policy favoring arbitration and the resulting 
pro-arbitration bias pulsing through its jurisprudence.132 In early cases 
developing this national policy, in the 1980s, there was divergence on 
ideological grounds between the Justices as to federalism—a majority willing to 
invade state territory while a conservative minority resisted on federalism 
grounds—notably Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist in the 1980s and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas later.133 That initial rallying charge was led by another 
conservative, Justice Burger, and gradually all but Justice Thomas capitulated 
to federalization.134 That said, opinions by Justices Thomas and Rehnquist 
concerning federalism exhibit the narrowest gap between the rhetoric of 
contracts and the reality.135 
Though ideology does not explain the rhetoric–reality gap, it does influence 
its shape. Justice Brennan, liberal lion, wrote the Court’s most forceful 
 
 131.  E.g., Alan Scott Rau, “Separability” in the United States Supreme Court, STOCKHOLM INT’L 
ARB. REV., 13 (06/2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893601 (referencing opinions by Justice 
Scalia); Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469, 486 (2006) (referencing 
opinion by Justice Souter). The Court receives plenty of briefs and could read the substantial literature 
about all aspects of the issues. But lawyers and scholars involved likewise have not stressed the 
rhetoric–reality gap, nor given the Court reason to redress it. Much of the Court’s jurisprudence, as 
with the literature, uses vocabulary unique to arbitration cases. The vocabulary is not only alien to the 
common law of contracts but sometimes suggests a subordination of contracts and contract law to 
arbitration and national policy. A pervasive, though modest, example of the subordination rhetoric is 
how the Court refers to contract law as providing “background principles.” Though this phrase is 
commonly used among contract-law scholars to designate default rules that parties can tailor in 
particular settings, the Court’s use suggests those default rules are subordinate to what it declares to be 
the principles of federal arbitration law. 
 132.  E.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 
383 (2008); Siegel, supra note 3, at 1142–43.  
 133.  See supra notes 17 & 19.  
 134.  For example, though many opinions and Justices have forged headlong into federal 
preemption of state law in this field, Justice Thomas, devotee of federalism, steadfastly dissents from 
preemption; Justice Scalia often echoes the objection but has retreated somewhat; Justice O’Connor 
once steadfastly opposed preemption but eventually relented; Chief Justice Rehnquist steered 
colleagues toward federalism.  
 135.  See supra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
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assertions of federal pro-arbitration policy in Moses Cone.136 Then-Justice 
Rehnquist, a conservative, objected to Justice Brennan’s opinion: “In its zeal to 
provide arbitration for a party it thinks deserving, the Court has made an 
exception to established rules of procedure”137—not an objection to FAA 
jurisprudence, but an acknowledgement of zealotry’s role in protecting a 
favored party class. Likewise, Justice Rehnquist, devotee of federalism, 
deferred to state law in Volt.138 In contrast, Justice Stevens, a liberal less moved 
by states’ rights, withheld deference in Mastrobuono on analytically identical 
facts.139 Stevens empathized with consumers, including securities-brokerage 
customers, and leaned over backwards in Mastrobuono to allow them an award 
of punitive damages. Justice Thomas, die-hard conservative, dissented. But the 
majority opinions in Volt and Mastrobuono stated the standard contract 
rhetoric and then applied federal arbitration jurisprudence discordantly. 
Justice Breyer wrote the Court’s principal opinions on the clarity of 
threshold intent about “who decides.”140 These opinions portray a moderate 
judge offering a nuanced approach, finding room for judicial oversight of 
arbitration. They commanded assent among the Justices.141 In contrast, Justice 
Scalia wrote the Court’s recent opinions on the severability doctrine.142 Those 
reflect a conservative judge taking a formal approach committed to the 
arbitrator’s power. They prompted dissents by liberal Justices, like Stevens, who 
are more willing to use policing tools such as unconscionability. But all these, 
and other opinions—by Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsberg, Scalia, Souter and 
Stevens—first venerated contract law and then applied arbitration 
jurisprudence in ways at odds with contract law.143 So there is little doubt that 
 
 136.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). See supra text 
accompanying notes 20–27. 
 137.  Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 138.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). See 
supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
 139.  Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). See supra text 
accompanying notes 30–38. 
 140.  See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). See supra text accompanying notes 45–54 (discussing First Options); 
supra text accompanying notes 55–62 (discussing Howsam). 
 141.  First Options was unanimous and Howsam nearly unanimous, with only Justice Thomas filing 
a concurring opinion.  
 142.  Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). See supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (discussing Buckeye); supra 
text accompanying notes 71–75 (discussing Rent-A-Center). 
 143.  Justice Alito, a conservative, strained himself in Stolt-Neilsen to prevent class actions against 
businesses over the liberal Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which called the majority out for benefiting big 
business on terms that may not apply to help consumers, with both opinions making the same points 
about contractual freedom and contract law and then burying that in conflicting federal arbitration 
jurisprudence. Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). See supra text 
accompanying notes 78–88. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Arthur Andersen, taking an expansive 
view of third-party-beneficiary law, prompted a dissent joined by the liberal Justice Stevens, the 
conservative Justice Roberts, and the moderate Justice Souter—and all show the gap. Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009). See supra text accompanying notes 90–95. Justice Souter’s 
majority opinion in Hall Street, denying contractual freedom to expand judicial review of arbitration 
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ideology plays a role in how the Justices approach federal arbitration 
jurisprudence and how they perceive, describe, and apply contract law 
principles. But the rhetoric–reality gap transcends the ideological spectrum, 
making this at best a partial explanation for the character of the gap. 
Nor is it the case that the Justices are faithful to or disagree about a 
particular theory of contract law or school of contract-law thought—such as 
classical, formalist, realist, anti-formalist, neo-formalist, or anything else. Far 
from struggling to classify contract law into such categories, the Court elides 
them, sallying forth to state and apply versions of contract law that suit its 
national policy favoring arbitration.144 Indeed, the persistence and widening of 
the rhetoric–reality gap is likely also due to there being no higher court that can 
correct the Supreme Court, even in matters outside its bailiwick, such as 
contract law. The story helps to underscore the beauty of the common law as a 
system. It seems highly unlikely that a group of nine judges, sitting on high and 
hearing a handful of cases annually over a few decades, will produce law as 
appealing as that produced in contract-law jurisprudence over centuries by up 
to fifty state supreme courts plus England’s high courts over tens of thousands 
of cases. 
D. Costs 
Scholarly debate concerning federal arbitration jurisprudence is dominated 
by disagreement about the comparative efficacy of arbitration compared to 
litigation.145 What is at stake is the fairness and efficiency of the process. By 
studying federal arbitration jurisprudence from the perspective of contract 
rhetoric versus reality, a different set of problems appears. These concern the 
effects of a federal jurisprudence that is often wrong and misleading about 
contracts and contract law. The rhetoric–reality gap produces abstract costs of 
illegitimacy; defiance or distortion; incoherence; and misperception. 
Any gap between what judges or other public officials do and what they say 
creates risk to the legitimacy of the official and the official’s actions. The 
rhetoric–reality gap in federal arbitration jurisprudence exposes several 
legitimacy problems. The talk of freedom of contract obscures how the primary 
engine of this jurisprudence is the Court’s discernment of a national policy 
favoring arbitration. This policy has nothing to do with freedom of contract or 
with the exquisitely apolitical body of contact law,146 but has everything to do 
 
awards, prompted two dissents—one by the liberal Justice Stevens and joined by the conservative 
Justice Kennedy, and one by the moderate Justice Breyer. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 
U.S. 576 (2008). See supra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
 144.  The only version of such a theory that the Court tends to embrace is the notion of “contorts.” 
See supra Part III.A.3. But that is not so much a school of thought as it is a critical account of certain 
trends in common-law jurisprudence evident in the period before 1970.  
 145.  See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 146.  See David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breach is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 
1011 (2010) (“[C]ontract law is usually considered to be the most technical and least political of the 
first-year law courses . . . .”).  
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with judicial power and institutional prerogatives.147 It is also by definition a 
national rather than state policy; the talk of deference to state contract law as a 
gesture to federalism not only makes the assertion hypocritical but invalidly 
mutes valid federalism objections to the Court’s usurpation of the field. 
A related risk of perceived illegitimacy is that the Court’s pronouncements 
may provoke state defiance.148 The Supreme Court faces rebuke from state 
courts, which thumb their noses at the Court,149 or state legislatures, which 
sometimes leave on the books statutes that would be illegal under its 
precedents.150 Obviously, such state objections to federal invasion may exist 
even if the Court’s rhetoric were faithful to its applications. But it seems likely 
that the gap between rhetoric and reality fortifies state objections; it invites 
states to explain why, under contract law as state officials know it—unlike how 
the Supreme Court develops it—the state is correct and the Court wrong. State 
officials may have a duty to resist usurpations of constitutionally protected state 
prerogatives, including those that federal law purports to preempt under the 
FAA.151 
On the other hand, some states simply knuckle under, declaring the Court’s 
opinions the law of the land and withdrawing contrary state opinions after being 
rebuked.152 Though not all states defy the federal regime, those following it 
often cause the problem of distortion. Before Prima Paint,153 leading state courts 
held that defenses asserting fraud in the inducement were for courts to decide, 
not arbitrators. Among these was New York, leader in contract law, including in 
arbitration cases.154 The grounds were straightforward principles of contract law: 
The arbitration clause was not severable from the principal contract. Similar 
results and reasoning appeared elsewhere.155 Prima Paint led New York to 
 
 147.  See Anthony Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior (unpublished manuscript) (July 
31, 2010), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1434685.  
 148.  See David A. Straus, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1866 (2005) 
(“To question the legitimacy of something—a constitution, a statute, a legal regime—is to question 
whether it is entitled to obedience.”). 
 149.  See generally Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); see Scott J. Burnham, 
The War Against Arbitration in Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV. 139 (2005) (discussing the tension between 
a federal act telling states not to treat arbitration clauses differently from general contract provisions 
and a state statute limiting the enforceability of arbitration provisions).  
 150.  See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 20, 39 n.126 (2d 
ed. 2007) (listing examples of existing state laws from California, Colorado, Georgia, New York, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and Vermont, which are likely preempted under the 
Supreme Court’s cases).  
 151.  See generally David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129 (2004). 
 152.  E.g., Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 930 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 2006) (Florida 
Supreme Court so capitulating after the Supreme Court opinion in Buckeye). 
 153.  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See supra text 
accompanying notes 63–66. 
 154.  E.g., Wrap-Vertsier Corp. v. Plotnick, 143 N.E.2d 366 (N.Y. 1957).  
 155.  E.g., Am. Airlines v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 816–17 (11th Cir. 
1959); Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (Jerome Frank, J.). 
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switch and to instead follow the federal rule.156 The grounds were a more 
adventuresome principle of arbitration policy: Following contract law 
“defeats . . . two of arbitration’s primary virtues, speed and finality.”157 
The Court’s jurisprudence has prompted the distortion of state law in other 
states, too, including in California. The state’s high court likewise construed the 
California arbitration statute to distinguish sharply between arbitration clauses 
and the broader contracts of which they usually are part.158 The court’s rationale 
was the same: putting arbitration policy above freedom of contract. In dissent, 
Justice Mosk declared the court’s approach to be putting the cart before the 
horse, showing “resupination: logic and procedure turned upside down.”159 
Mosk was more persuaded by the “irrefutable dissent” in Prima Paint and the 
few state courts that held out against the sweep of the federal rule.160 Mosk 
stressed that, if arbitration is really a matter of contract, then courts must take 
seriously—and not merely rhetorically—basic principles, including that “one of 
the essential elements of a contract [is] that the parties enter into it knowingly 
and consensually, not through fraud, duress, menace, undue influence, or 
mistake.”161 
The gap and challenges to jurisprudential legitimacy pose additional 
practical problems of doctrinal incoherence, both within federal jurisprudence 
and collaterally on the law of contracts. The Court’s jurisprudence is often 
confusing, especially concerning questions such as “who decides”162 and what 
“clear and unmistakable” means.163 The confusion is likely at least a partial 
product of the Supreme Court’s assertions that contracts and contract law 
dominate with applications showing that a national federal policy favoring 
arbitration dominates. Indeed, the concept of “clear and unmistakable” simply 
does not appear as an interpretive principle or presumption anywhere in the 
law of contracts.164 Worse, other courts are nevertheless tempted by the 
 
 156.  Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47 (N.Y. 1973).  
 157.  Id. The court thought its new-found approach more compatible with both “the initial intent of 
the parties as well as legislative policy” and further justified because it aligned state law with the federal 
rule. It stressed its belief that “no party” agrees to arbitration’s scope “based on whether the contract in 
question involves interstate commerce.” Id. The Supreme Court echoed that sentiment in Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). See supra text accompanying notes 39–44. 
 158.  Ericksen v. 100 Oak St., 673 P.2d 251, 257 (1983).  
 159.  Id. at 258 (Mosk, J., dissenting).  
 160.  E.g., George Engine Co. v. S. Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881, 884–85 (La. 1977). 
 161.  Ericksen, 673 P.2d at 260 (Mosk, J., dissenting).  
 162.  See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). See supra text accompanying 
notes 75–78. 
 163.  See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). See supra text accompanying notes 45–54 (discussing First Options); 
supra text accompanying notes 55–62 (discussing Howsam). 
 164.  The phrase “clear and unmistakable” is not used in law generally. It is an invention of the 
Supreme Court that the Court has used with some regularity in the context of addressing waivers in the 
labor-union context and in ascertaining congressional intent. A December 2010 Westlaw search for this 
phrase in Supreme Court opinions returned a mere sixty-six instances, the vast majority using the 
phrase colloquially rather than as an operative legal standard. 
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Supreme Court’s lead to adapt statements of presumptions about contractual 
intent from the arbitration context to the general context of contracts.165 
A cumulative variation of all these problems is the problem of 
misperception. The Court’s rhetoric, taken literally, gives contract law a bad 
name. For example, Professor Linda Mullenix wrote: “[T]he supremacy of 
contract law over long-established jurisdictional doctrines has significantly 
eroded certain fundamental litigation rights.”166 This lays the blame for 
infirmities in the Court’s jurisprudence on contract law. But it is not the 
“supremacy of contract law” that is responsible for any such infirmities that may 
exist. It is the rhetorical invocation of notions of contracts while really using a 
different batch of arbitration jurisprudence. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
My initial motivation for writing this article was receipt in early 2010 of a 
reprint of an Illinois Law Review article by noted arbitration scholar Thomas 
Stipanowich, apparently sent to contract-law teachers nationally.167 In a 
comprehensive review of the state of arbitration law and practice, the piece 
criticized editors of Contracts casebooks for paying too little attention to 
arbitration, especially for how the attention given was often extremely 
negative.168 As a contract-law teacher for twenty years, the point resonated with 
me.169 With modest exceptions, contract-law books and courses have not 
generally given arbitration much in-depth treatment, and the treatment is often 
in the context of illustrating doctrines like unconscionability or lopsided terms 
not comporting with reasonable expectations of a community. The piece thus 
stimulated my interest in arbitration. 
I began following pending Supreme Court cases on the subject and 
scrutinizing those handed down in preceding terms. I found the Court’s talk 
about contracts and contract law intriguing because it made it sound as if 
arbitration were at the center of contract law and contract law at the center of 
arbitration law. This idea made it seem irresponsible for me, Contracts-
casebook editors, and other teachers to leave arbitration at the margins of the 
Contracts course or outside it altogether. Alas, the truth is that contracts and 
 
 165.  For instance, there is no general principle of contract law directing the construction of 
ambiguous clauses in favor of arbitration, yet courts have enlarged the Court’s version of that 
statement to portray it as a general principle of contract law. E.g., Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, Inc., 2 
F. Supp. 2d 1473 (M.D. Ga. 1998).  
 166.  Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 296–97 (1988). 
 167.  Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: the “New Litigation”, U. ILL. L. REV., 2010, at 1.  
 168.  Id. at 50.  
 169.  Similar points have resonated with peers. See Richard L. Barnes, Manipulating Court Doctrine 
for the Good of the Common Law and Compulsory Arbitration, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 41, 42 (2009) (“Five 
years ago, after having taught contracts for fifteen years, [the FAA] was little more than a footnote to 
me. Yet that statute can have an enormous impact [on] the common law . . . .”). 
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contract law have so little to do with what happens in arbitration jurisprudence, 
particularly compared to Court rhetoric, that it would confuse or mislead 
students taking Contracts to provide it as an illustration. To that extent, 
arbitration thus deserves the glancing treatment in the Contracts course, 
warranting treatment in a separate one.170 
Even so, Contracts teachers and students may wish to pay more concerted 
attention to what the Court has been up to because the rhetoric–reality gap 
should be of some concern to them. Moreover, as pressure to close the gap 
builds, the Court may abandon its novel experiment with a national policy 
favoring arbitration dressed in contract rhetoric and embrace the older national 
policy favoring real freedom of contract. That would be of great interest to 
Contracts teachers and students. In fact, the idea raises one of this article’s 
normative implications worth stating explicitly: The Court should either give up 
its national policy favoring arbitration and truly respect freedom of contract or 
come clean about its national policy’s real implications, and acknowledge its 
embrace of a restricted conception of contracts and contract law. 
 
 
 170.  One prominent casebook, IAN AYRES & RICAHRD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 
(7th ed. 2008), does devote a short chapter to contractual aspects of federal arbitration jurisprudence, 
but a survey of teachers who use the book and of syllabi available online shows that the materials are 
rarely covered.  
